Abstract. Generalized Jacobians are natural candidates to use in discrete logarithm (DL) based cryptography since they include the multiplicative group of …nite …elds, algebraic tori, elliptic curves as well as all Jacobians of curves. This observation therefore raised the possibility that other families of generalized Jacobians may be of cryptographic interest. This exploration began with the study of the simplest nontrivial generalized Jacobians of an elliptic curve, for which an e¢ cient group law algorithm was recently obtained. With these explicit equations at hand, it is now possible to concretely study the corresponding discrete logarithm problem (DLP); this is what we undertake in this paper. In short, our results highlight the close links between the DLP in these generalized Jacobians and the ones in the underlying elliptic curve and …nite …eld.
Introduction
Throughout the year, cryptographers are proudly celebrating three decades of public-key cryptography. In a word, concrete public-key cryptosystems exist because we know computational problems which, despite our greatest joint e¤orts, remain very hard to solve. We could thus say that Di¢ e and Hellman [DH76] thought us how to be optimistic by turning our incapacity of solving these problems into an amazingly elegant and powerful technique.
In addition of being the …rst such problem to be used in public-key cryptography, the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) remains without a doubt one of the most popular choices used nowadays to design cryptographic protocols.
De…nition 1. Let G be a …nite group and g be an element of G. Given h 2 hgi, the smallest non-negative integer k such that g k = h is called the discrete logarithm of h (to the base g) and is denoted log g h.
In order to use the full potential of the well-established versatility of discrete logarithms, we are then constantly looking for new groups with potentially hard DLPs.
Generalized Jacobians appear to be a good source of such groups. Indeed, recall that the ElGamal, Elliptic and Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptosystems as well as XTR, LUC and CEILIDH can all be understood in terms of generalized Jacobians [Déc06] . So from a cryptographic point of view, two remarkable subfamilies of generalized Jacobians are algebraic tori and usual Jacobians. In order to determine whether other generalized Jacobians are suitable for DL-based cryptography, it was thus necessary to consider a family whose groups are neither Jacobians nor tori. To do so, the simplest nontrivial generalized Jacobians of an elliptic curve was recently put forward and it was shown how to compactly represent their elements, e¢ ciently compute the group law and readily determine the cardinality of these groups [Déc06] .
But since e¢ ciency without security is of no use in cryptography, we investigate in this paper the corresponding discrete logarithm problem. We …rst show that extracting a DL in these groups can always be performed by sequentially solving an instance of the DLP in the underlying elliptic curve E followed by one in the chosen …nite …eld F . On the other hand, we demonstrate that the DLP in these generalized Jacobians is at least as hard as the DLP in E and at least as hard as the DLP in F . Finally, we discuss the case where E is a pairing-friendly curve and highlight an apparent distinct behavior of the corresponding generalized Jacobians.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the construction of generalized Jacobians and recall the group law for the explicit family we consider. In Section 3, we obtain a closed expression involving three di¤erent DLPs, from which follows a natural solution to the DLP in these generalized Jacobians. Two reductions among discrete logarithm problems are then obtained in Section 4. We discuss the case of pairing-friendly curves in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
Generalized Jacobians of an Elliptic Curve
The goal of this section is to present a minimalist aide-mémoire of the construction of generalized Jacobians as well as the explicit group law for the family we are studying. For a complete treatment, please refer to the classical texts by Maxwell Rosenlicht [Ros52, Ros54] and Jean-Pierre Serre [Ser75, Ser88] . Although the underlying theory truly sheds some light on the intrinsic structure of these groups, the utterly simple equations for the group operation is all that will be needed for the sequel.
Let C be a smooth algebraic curve de…ned over an algebraically closed …eld K and m = P P 2C m P (P ) 2 Div(C) be an e¤ective divisor 1 , thereafter called a modulus. The explicit family of generalized Jacobians we consider can now be described as follows. Let E be a smooth elliptic curve de…ned over the …nite …eld 2 F q with q elements and let B 2 E(F q ) be a point of prime order l. Let also m = (M ) + (N ) be a B-unrelated modulus 3 with M and N distinct points of E(F q r ), where r 1 is a chosen integer. Finally, the corresponding generalized Jacobian J m is in this case a semi-abelian variety 4 which is an extension of algebraic groups 5 of E by the multiplicative group G m .
In order to obtain a compact and convenient representation for the elements of J m and a group law algorithm using this representation, the …rst step followed in [Déc06] was to obtain an explicit bijection of sets between Pic 0 m (E) and G m E. Thus in this particular case, an element of J m can be viewed as a pair (k; P ), where k 2 G m and P 2 E. The known addition on Pic 0 m (E) could then be used to endow, via , the set G m E with the desired group structure.
More explicitly, let (k 1 ; P 1 ) and (k 2 ; P 2 ) be elements of J m such that P 1 , P 2 , (P 1 + P 2 ) = 2 fM; N g. Then,
(k 1 ; P 1 ) + (k 2 ; P 2 ) = (k 1 k 2 c m (P 1 ; P 2 ); P 1 + P 2 ) , where c m : E E ! G m is the 2-cocycle given by
, and`P ;Q denotes the equation of the straight line passing through P and Q (tangent at the curve if P = Q) [Déc06, Theorem 5]. Several basic properties can be easily derived from these explicit equations [Déc06, Section 5]. In particular, the set
This last property will turn out to play a central role in our study of the DLP. To sum up, F q r hBi together with the above group law is a …nite subgroup of J m of order (q r 1) l for which the elements are compactly represented and the group law e¢ ciently computable. That being said, we are now ready to study the discrete logarithm problem in F q r hBi.
A Natural Solution
The purpose of this section is to present a natural method to extract discrete logarithms in F q r hBi. To do so, the …rst step will be to take a closer look at the scalar multiplication in this group. So given (k; P ) 2 F q r hBi and a non-negative integer n, we are here looking for an e¢ cient way to compute the scalar multiple n(k; P ). First remark that a repeated application of the group law yields n(k; P ) = ( ; nP ). Thus if we set n 0 = n mod l, we get n(k; P ) = ( ; n 0 P ). So instead of computing n(k; P ) directly, we could make use of the value of n 0 (k; P ). Indeed, if we let n 1 = bn=lc, then n = n 1 l + n 0 and so n(k; P ) = n 1 l(k; P ) + n 0 (k; P ). Therefore, if we let l(k; P ) = ( ; O) and n 0 (k; P ) = ( n 0 ; n 0 P ), we obtain
by repeated applications of (1). Hence, evaluating n(k; P ) using this method essentially requires to compute 6 , n 1 and n 0 (k; P ). Finally, notice that the simple equality n(k; P ) = ( n 0 n 1 ; n 0 P ) in fact relates three instances of the discrete logarithm problem in three di¤erent groups, namely a generalized Jacobian, an elliptic curve and a …nite …eld. We have therefore shown: Lemma 1. Let E be a smooth elliptic curve de…ned over F q , B 2 E(F q ) be a point of prime order l and m = (M ) + (N ) be a B-unrelated modulus, where M and N are distinct points of E (F q r ). For (k; P ) 2 F q r hBi and a non-negative integer n, let n 0 = n mod l, n 1 = bn=lc, l(k; P ) = ( ; O) and n 0 (k; P ) = ( n 0 ; n 0 P ). Then, n(k; P ) = ( n 0 n 1 ; n 0 P ).
Next we see how this lemma provides a natural solution to compute discrete logarithms in these generalized Jacobians when F q r hBi is a cyclic subgroup of J m . The goal of this exercise is to give an upper bound on the overall complexity of this problem.
So given a generator (k; P ) 2 F q r hBi and an element (j; Q) 2 F q r hBi, we need to determine the least non-negative integer n such that n(k; P ) = (j; Q). By the above lemma, we have that
where we keep the notation n 0 = n mod l, n 1 = bn=lc, l(k; P ) = ( ; O) and n 0 (k; P ) = ( n 0 ; n 0 P ). Thus, given the values of j = n 0 n 1 and Q = n 0 P , our task is to recover n. First notice that knowing n is equivalent 7 to knowing both n 0 and n 1 . Also observe that Q is independent of n 1 while j depends on both n 0 and n 1 . The obvious strategy is then to start by solving an instance of the discrete logarithm problem in E in order to recover n 0 from Q = n 0 P . Once n 0 is known, the value of n 0 can be easily computed, as n 0 (k; P ) = ( n 0 ; n 0 P ). Next derive the value of n 1 by computing 8 1 n 0 j. Then recover n 1 by extracting the discrete logarithm of n 1 to the base 9 . At last, set n = n 1 l+n 0 . Figure 2 summarizes this sequence of computations.
Lemma 2. Let E be a smooth elliptic curve de…ned over F q , B 2 E(F q ) be a point of prime order l and m = (M ) + (N ) be a B-unrelated modulus, where M and N are distinct points of E (F q r ) such that F q r hBi is a cyclic subgroup of J m . Then, the discrete logarithm problem in F q r hBi is no harder than sequentially solving a discrete logarithm in E followed by one in F q r .
Informally speaking, the next step is to ask whether it is possible to …nd a quicker way to solve this DLP. In particular,
-If we know how to solve the DLP in F q r hBi, do we necessarily know how to solve it in E? -If we know how to solve the DLP in F q r hBi, do we necessarily know how to solve it in F q r ? -Is it possible to solve a DLP in F q r hBi by solving one in E and one in F q r in parallel? -Can some precomputations be made in order to speed up the extraction of a DL in F q r hBi?
7 Since l is public and n = n1l + n0. 8 Notice that n 0 6 = 0 since by construction, n 0 2 F q r . 9 Remark that has order q r 1 since h(k; P )i = F q r hBi by hypothesis. Fig. 2 . Natural solution to a DLP in the generalized Jacobian
The remainder of this paper focuses on the …rst three questions, while a discussion around the last question can be found in [Déc05, Section 5.5.3].
Reductions among Discrete Logarithm Problems
To ease the exposition, we will assume throughout this section that F q r hBi is a cyclic subgroup of J m generated by (k; P ). In short, the goal we are now after is to show that any given algorithm that solves DLPs in F q r hBi may be used as a subroutine 10 to solve DLPs in E as well as in F q r . For completeness, a review of fundamental properties of discrete logarithms needed to prove the results of this section is included in the appendix.
Lemma 3. Let E be a smooth elliptic curve over F q , B 2 E (F q ) be a point of prime order l, m = (M ) + (N ) be a B-unrelated modulus, where M and N are distinct points of E (F q r ) such that F q r hBi is a cyclic subgroup of J m . Then, the discrete logarithm problem in F q r hBi is at least as hard as the discrete logarithm problem in hBi E (F q ).
Proof. Let A Jm be an algorithm that has a non-negligible probability of solving discrete logarithms in F q r hBi to the base (k; P ), where (k; P ) is a generator of F q r hBi. We wish to show that there is an algorithm A E having a non-negligible probability of solving discrete logarithms in hBi to the base P . So let Q = n 0 P be an instance of the discrete logarithm problem in hBi, where 0 n 0 < l. By the random self-reducible property of discrete logarithms, we can assume without loss of generality that given any element of F q r hBi, its discrete logarithm (to the base (k; P )) has a non-negligible probability of being obtained with A Jm . Now, for a randomly chosen element j 2 F q r , invoke A Jm on input (j; Q). With nonnegligible probability, a non-negative integer n such that n(k; P ) = (j; Q) will be obtained, yielding n 0 = n mod l. Next we show a similar reduction between the discrete logarithm problem in F q r hBi and in F q r . Notice how this proof di¤ers from the previous one, even though the same underlying technique is used in both proofs.
Lemma 4. Let E be a smooth elliptic curve over F q , B 2 E (F q ) be a point of prime order l, m = (M ) + (N ) be a B-unrelated modulus, where M and N are distinct points of E (F q r ) such that F q r hBi is a cyclic subgroup of J m . Then, the discrete logarithm problem in F q r hBi is at least as hard as the discrete logarithm problem in F q r .
Proof. Let A Jm be an algorithm that has a non-negligible probability of solving discrete logarithms in F q r hBi to the base (k; P ), where (k; P ) is a generator of F q r hBi. We want to show the existence of an algorithm A F q r having a non-negligible probability of solving discrete logarithms in F q r to the base g, where g is an arbitrary generator of F q r . Thus let h = g n be an instance of the discrete logarithm problem in F q r , with 0 n < q r 1. As usual, we can assume without loss of generality that given any element of F q r hBi, its discrete logarithm (to the base (k; P )) has a non-negligible probability of being obtained with A Jm (by the random self-reducible property). Invoking A Jm twice, on inputs (g; O) and (h; O), will yield with non-negligible probability integers a and b satisfying (g; O) = a (k; P ), (h; O) = b (k; P ) and 0 a; b < (q r 1) l. Notice that l must divide both a and b, so there are integers c and d such that a = c l, b = d l and 0 c; d < (q r 1).
If we now let l (k; P ) = ( ; O), then has to be a generator of F q r since (k; P ) generates F q r hBi by hypothesis. We then have g = c since
Moreover, both g and generate F q r , from which follows that gcd(c; q r 1) = 1. Lastly, by repeated applications of (1), we have
and we …nally get n = c 1 d mod(q r 1).
. Converting an instance of the DLP in F q r into two instances in F q r hBi
From a practical point of view, the two lemmas of this section imply that even though generalized Jacobians are newcomers in cryptography, we already know that solving their DLP cannot be easier than solving discrete logarithms in two of the most studied groups used in DL-based cryptography today.
Generalized Jacobians of Pairing-friendly Curves
Now that we have strong evidences that the discrete logarithm problem in the generalized Jacobians we consider is a computationally di¢ cult problem, we further investigate the natural solution proposed in Section 3. We will thus also assume here that F q r hBi is a cyclic subgroup of J m generated by (k; P ).Recall that Lemma 2 showed that an instance of the DLP in F q r hBi can be solved by sequentially extracting a discrete logarithm in E followed by one in F q r . We next try to determine under which circumstances the DLP in F q r hBi could be performed any faster.
As usual, let (j; Q) = n(k; P ) be an instance of the DLP in F q r hBi to be solved, where 0 n < (q r 1) l. By Lemma 1, we know that
where we keep the notation n = n 1 l + n 0 , 0 n 0 < l, 0 n 1 < q r 1 as well as l(k; P ) = ( ; O) and n 0 (k; P ) = ( n 0 ; n 0 P ). Notice that the sequential solution of Section 3 performs computations involving n 0 n 1 only once n 0 is known, as depicted in Figure 2 . We could instead attempt to extract a discrete logarithm in F q r in parallel with the one in the elliptic curve. On one hand, using identity (3), one can start to solve Q = n 0 P for n 0 by extracting a discrete logarithm in E. In the meantime, we could also start to extract a discrete logarithm in the …nite …eld as follows. This time, let n 2 = n mod (q r 1) .
Then compute l (j; Q) which will equal, say, (j 0 ; O). We now have:
Since j 0 and are known, we can then solve the following DLP in F q r in order to get n 2 :
Remark that this can be done in parallel with the computation of n 0 . Finally, try to combine n 0 and n 2 using the Chinese remainder theorem 11 in order to recover n. However, we must have gcd (l; q r 1) = 1 to fully recover n with this method. We summarize this observation below.
Lemma 5. Let E be a smooth elliptic curve de…ned over F q , B 2 E(F q ) be a point of prime order l and m = (M ) + (N ) be a B-unrelated modulus, where M and N are distinct points of E (F q r ) such that F q r hBi is a cyclic subgroup of J m . If l -q r 1, then the discrete logarithm problem in F q r hBi is no harder than solving a discrete logarithm in E and one in F q r in parallel.
We now turn our attention to the case l j q r 1, that is, the case of pairing-friendly curves 12 . In this case, the order of F q r hBi is of the form d l , where 2 and l -d. Just as before, let (j; Q) = n (k; P ) be the instance of the DLP we wish to solve. In order to use the Chinese remainder theorem to recover n, we now compute
This can be achieved as follows.
1. We start by computing n d . First compute l (j; Q), which will equal, say, (j 0 ; O). Now,
which means that
where j 0 and l 1 are known. It thus su¢ ces to solve a DLP in F q r in order to recover n d . 2. Next we determine n .
(a) First let n 0 = n mod l (= n mod l). Since (j; Q) = n (k; P ) = ( ; nP ) = ( ; n 0 P ), we have Q = n 0 P . The value of n 0 can thus be obtained by solving a DLP in the elliptic curve 13 . (b) Next we compute
To do so, write n as n 0 + n 1 l + ml 2 for some (unknown) integer m and compute dl 2 (j; Q) to get, say, j 00 ; dl 2 Q . Then,
where is simply the product of the 2-cocycles from repeated applications of the group law. Notice that can be computed directly from Q and dl 2 . It therefore follows that j 00
where the only unknown is n 1 . Thus, n 1 can be obtained by solving a DLP in F q r . (c) If = 2, then we are done since n = n 0 +n 1 l. Otherwise, proceed to compute n 2 such that
and repeat this process for n 3 , n 4 , ..., n 1 . Finally, get n = n 0 + n 1 l + n 2 l 2 + ::: + n 1 l 1 . 3. Combine n d and n using the Chinese remainder theorem to get n.
A remarkable property of this method 14 is that the value of n 0 is used to compute n 1 . As a result, this suggests that the value of n 0 , obtained by solving a DLP in E, should be known prior to the computation of n 1 . In other words, to compute n , the discrete logarithm in the elliptic curve should be performed …rst, and be followed by discrete logarithms in F q r . Therefore, the natural solution of Section 3 is still preferable to the above method à la Pohlig-Hellman in the case of pairing-friendly curves. We are therefore left with the following open question. Question 1. Let E be a smooth elliptic curve de…ned over F q , B 2 E(F q ) be a point of prime order l and m = (M )+(N ) be a B-unrelated modulus, where M and N are distinct points of E (F q r ) such that F q r hBi is a cyclic subgroup of J m . If l j q r 1, is it possible to solve a DLP in F q r hBi signi…cantly faster than with the sequential solution of Section 3?
Outlook
This paper was devoted to the study of the DLP in the simplest nontrivial generalized Jacobians of an elliptic curve. Thanks to the explicit equations for this group law from [Déc06], it was not only possible to give an upper bound on the di¢ culty of this problem, but most importantly to show that this problem is at least as hard as two well-studied computational problems, namely the DLP in elliptic curves and in …nite …elds.
As a result, the abelian group F q r hBi ful…lls the four basic requirements for a group to be suitable for DL-based cryptography, as its elements are easily represented in a compact form, its group law is e¢ -ciently computable, its order is readily determined and its DLP is believed to be intractable.
This therefore shows that the family of generalized Jacobians that are suitable for cryptographic applications strictly contains algebraic tori and Jacobians of curves. that has a non-negligible probability of solving discrete logarithms in G to the base g 1 can readily be turned into an algorithm A 2 having nonnegligible probability of solving discrete logarithms in G to the base g 2 . Indeed, let h = g a 2 be an instance of the DLP in G to be solved. By the random self-reducible property of discrete logarithms, we can assume without loss of generality that for any s 2 G, A 1 has a non-negligible probability of producing log g 1 s. So …rst invoke A 1 on input g 2 in order to get, with non-negligible probability, an integer b such that g 2 = g b 1 and 0 < b < n. Since g 1 and g 2 are both generators, it follows that gcd (n; b) = 1, and so b is an invertible element of Z /nZ . Then compute an integer c such that bc 1 (mod n) and 0 < c < n using, for instance, the extended Euclidean algorithm [MvOV96, Algorithm 2.107]. Then, Next, we can obtain with non-negligible probability an integer d such that h = g d 1 and 0 d < n by invoking A 1 on input h. Finally,
and so a = cd mod n, which completes the argument. 
